聯(lián)邦法院禁止USPTO依據(jù)§145條請求獲得地區(qū)法院訴訟中的律師費補償

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發(fā)布：IPRdaily中文網(wǎng)（IPRdaily.cn）

作者：A. John Murray律師 及Kent E. Genin律師

供稿：Brinks Gilson & Lione律師事務(wù)所

原標題：聯(lián)邦巡回法院全席審理禁止美國專利及商標局依據(jù)§145條請求獲得地區(qū)法院訴訟中的律師費補償 - Nantkwest, Inc. v. Iancu, No. 2016-1794 (Fed. Cir. July 27, 2018)(en banc)

本文案件中，聯(lián)邦巡回法院經(jīng)全院審理后認為，專利申請人如援引專利法§ 145條于地區(qū)法院對專利審查與上訴委員會的裁決進行挑戰(zhàn)，依據(jù)“美國規(guī)則”中訴訟雙方各自承擔(dān)本方律師費原則，專利申請人無需支付PTO的律師費用。全院審理中4票反對意見則支持國會在制定§ 145條時已具體明確了申請人應(yīng)承擔(dān)“訴訟所有花費”。本案很可能在未來得到最高法院就此問題的最終裁決。

近期，聯(lián)邦巡回法院經(jīng)全院審理（en banc）后駁回了美國專利及商標局（United States Patent and Trademark Office , PTO）的以下論點：在地區(qū)法院為審查員駁回申請作出成功辯護后，未成功的申請人需強令支付PTO的律師費。

當PTO的專利審查與上訴委員會（Patent Trial and Appeal Board, Board）做出維持審查員駁回專利申請的裁決后，美國專利法 § 145條允許申請人在地區(qū)法院對委員會的裁決進行挑戰(zhàn)。申請人如援引§ 145條則被要求支付PTO為委員會裁決進行辯護所產(chǎn)生的全部訴訟花費（all the expenses of the proceedings），無論訴訟結(jié)果為何。

從歷史上來看，PTO依據(jù)這一條規(guī)定來彌補其在公務(wù)差旅和印刷上的總花費，近期還包括專家證人的費用。

本案中，法院所需解答的問題為§ 145條是否也強令申請人支付PTO產(chǎn)生的律師費用。

本案的專利申請包含一種使用自然殺手細胞治療癌癥的方法。2010年，PTO的審查員基于顯而易見性駁回申請，2013年委員會做出維持審查員駁回的裁決。依據(jù)§145條，NantKwest于美國弗吉尼亞州東區(qū)地方法院對委員會的裁決發(fā)起挑戰(zhàn)。在地區(qū)法院的審理中，PTO成功獲得申請人的權(quán)利要求具有顯而易見性的簡易判決。PTO隨后提交了一項依據(jù)§145條對訴訟花費報銷的動議，報銷費用中包含PTO的律師費。

地區(qū)法院駁回PTO動議中涉及律師費報銷的請求，法院援引“美國規(guī)則（American Rule）”：在沒有國會明確相反的指令下，訴訟各方承擔(dān)自己的律師費用。PTO對此上訴，由聯(lián)邦巡回法院三位法官組成的合議庭推翻了地區(qū)法院的裁決。法院之后依職權(quán)下令（sua sponte）對上訴案進行全院審理（en bance）并撤銷合議庭裁決。法院要求就一個問題進行概述：合議庭依據(jù)§ 145條的“全部訴訟花費”規(guī)定授予獎勵PTO律師費的裁決是否正確。

法院首先認為“美國規(guī)則”可適用于§ 145條。在此過程中法院駁回了PTO的論點 - § 145條不是在“美國規(guī)則”范圍內(nèi)的費用轉(zhuǎn)移法規(guī)（fee-shifting statute）。PTO依賴第四巡回法院在Shammas v. Focarino案中的意見：“美國規(guī)則”僅適用于將費用從勝訴方轉(zhuǎn)移至敗訴方的法規(guī)解釋。

因為§ 145條強令申請人支付“所有花費”，無論訴訟輸贏，所以PTO主張這并不屬于在“美國規(guī)則”范圍內(nèi)的費用轉(zhuǎn)移法規(guī)。法院審議了第四巡回法院的觀點 -“美國規(guī)則”不適用于對訴訟勝訴缺乏要求的法規(guī)，認為這是錯誤的。

法院認為§ 145條所陳述的“申請人應(yīng)支付訴訟的所有花費”缺乏取代“美國規(guī)則”所需之“具體和明確（specific and explicit）”的國會授權(quán)?！熬唧w和明確”要求需要“超越僅僅在語言上和有時被廣泛使用地隱含式支付（implicitly cover）律師費用?！狈ㄔ簩徸h了其他國會制定的法律條款，并得出結(jié)論這些條款證明了在通常情況下，業(yè)務(wù)津貼法定權(quán)利不包括隱含式授權(quán)獎賞律師費用。

首席法官 Prost撰寫了一篇長幅反對意見，她的三位同事也加入其中。反對意見認為當國會說“全部花費”既意味著所有的支出。反對意見指出PTO沒有聘請外部法律顧問以協(xié)助對§ 145條訴訟的辯護。相反，PTO使用領(lǐng)取政府薪金的律師。這些律師所產(chǎn)生的費用，是因為投入本案所花費的時間使其不可進行其他工作。

反對意見認為§ 145條的法律語言表明了國會“具體和明確”的使其與“美國規(guī)則”相分離之意圖，并強令申請人支付所有訴訟花費，包括PTO的人事費用。

截至目前，申請人援引§ 145條不要求支付PTO的律師費。但如反對意見所示，多數(shù)意見已經(jīng)形成了與第四巡回法院在Shammas案中的意見分歧。這一點加之目前案件中的反對意見，增加了最高法院可就此問題進行最終裁決的可能性。

附：英文全文

En Banc Federal Circuit Bars USPTO's Recovery of Attorney Fees in §145 District Court Actions - Nantkwest, Inc. v. Iancu, No. 2016-1794 (Fed. Cir. July 27, 2018)(en banc)

On July 27, 2018, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, rejected the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s (“PTO’s”) argument that, following their successful defense of an examiner’s rejection in district court, the unsuccessful applicant is compelled to pay the PTO’s attorney fees. When the PTO’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) affirms an examiner’s rejection of a patent application, § 145 of the Patent Act permits the applicant to challenge the Board’s decision in district court. Applicants who invoke § 145 are required to pay “[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings” incurred by the PTO in defending the Board’s decision, regardless of the outcome. Historically, the PTO has relied on this provision to recover sums it spent on travel and printing and, more recently, expert witnesses. In Nantkwest, the issue before the court was whether §145 also compelled the applicant to pay attorney fees incurred by the PTO.

The patent application at issue involved a method for treating cancer using natural killer cells. In 2010, a PTO examiner rejected the application as obvious and the Board affirmed the rejection in 2013. Pursuant to § 145, NantKwest challenged the Board’s decision in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Here, the PTO successfully moved for summary judgment that the application’s claims were obvious. The PTO then filed a motion for reimbursement of the expenses of the proceedings under § 145, including their attorney fees.

The district court denied the PTO’s motion with respect to attorney fees, citing the “American Rule”, i.e. that each litigant bears its own attorney fees absent clear contrary instruction from Congress. The PTO appealed and a divided panel of the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. Later, the court voted sua sponte to hear the appeal en banc and vacated the panel’s judgment. The court requested briefing on a single question: whether the panel correctly determined that § 145’s “all the expenses of the proceedings’ provision” authorizes an award of the PTO’s attorney fees.

The court first held that the American Rule applies to § 145. In doing so, the court rejected the PTO’s argument that § 145 is not a fee-shifting statute that falls within the American Rule’s ambit. The PTO had relied on the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Shammas v. Focarino, 784 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 2015), for the proposition that the American Rule only governs the interpretation of statutes that shift fees from a prevailing party to a losing party. The Shammas case involved a provision from the Lanham Act that is “nearly identical” to § 145 of the Patent Act. Because § 145 imposes “[a]ll the expenses” on the applicant, win or lose, the PTO asserted it is not a fee-shifting statute that falls within the American Rule’s ambit. The court considered the Fourth Circuit’s view that the American Rule does not apply to statutes lacking a success requirement to be misplaced.

The court went on to hold that § 145’s recitation that “[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings shall be paid by the applicant” lacks the “specific and explicit” congressional authorization required to displace the American Rule. The “specific and explicit” requirement demands “more than language that merely can be and is sometimes used broadly to implicitly cover attorneys’ fees.” (emphasis in original) The court reviewed other statutory provisions enacted by Congress and concluded that these demonstrated that ordinarily, a statutory right to expenses does not include an implicit authorization to award attorneys’ fees.

Chief Judge Prost authored a lengthy dissent, in which three of her colleagues joined. The dissent argued that when Congress said, “[a]ll the expenses,” they meant all the expenses. The dissent noted that the PTO did not retain outside counsel to assist in defending this § 145 action. Instead, it used its salaried government lawyers. These lawyers incurred expenses because the time they devoted to this case was not available for other work.

The dissent considered that the language of § 145 evinces Congress’s “specific and explicit” intent to depart from the American Rule and to impose upon the applicant payment of all the expenses of the proceedings, including the PTO’s personnel expenses.

For the present, applicants who invoke § 145 are not required to pay the PTO’s attorney fees. However, as noted by the dissent, the majority opinion has created a circuit split with the Fourth Circuit’s position in Shammas. This, together with the strong dissent in the present case, raises the possibility that the Supreme Court may have the final say as to this issue.

發(fā)布：IPRdaily中文網(wǎng)（IPRdaily.cn）

作者：A. John Murray律師 及Kent E. Genin律師

供稿：Brinks Gilson & Lione律師事務(wù)所

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